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Abstract. We show the results of the implementation of a prelimi-
nary algorithm for excluding ionospherically unsafe satellite geometries
in Ground-Based Augmentation Systems Category I. Minimum knowl-
edge of the ionospheric treat model is assumed and the assistance of
the code-carrier divergence monitor is not considered. All the satellites
in view above 5◦ in elevation are included in the computations. The
inﬂation of the standard deviation of the vertical ionospheric gradient
implements the exclusion. Full availability remains for a typical day in
the site of La Plata Airport.
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1 Introduction to GBAS
Ground-Based Augmentation System (GBAS) is a system that provides diﬀeren-
tial corrections and integrity monitoring of Global Navigation Satellite Systems
(GNSS) signals for navigation and precision approach service in the vicinity of
the host airport. GBAS yields the accuracy, integrity, continuity and availability
necessary for Category I, and eventually Category II, and III precision approach
operations [1, 2].
The system consists of three parts: 1) the satellite signal in space (SIS) coming
from one or several GNSS constellations; 2) the local Ground Facility (GGF)
equipped normally with four satellite receivers, processing equipment and a VHF
data broadcast (VDB) transmitter; and 3) the aircraft devices related to the
multi-mode receiver (MMR).
The GGF provides the aircraft with approach path data and, for each satellite
in view, geo-referenced range corrections and integrity information. The correc-
tions enable the aircraft to determine its position relative to the approach path
more accurately. Under nominal conditions these corrections are considered prac-
tically the same for the ground station and for the aircraft. That is, the basic
assumption of GBAS is that errors have a high local correlation.
Integrity is the function of a system that warns users in a timely manner
when the system or some part of it should not be used. The integrity function
prevents severe risks, eventually aﬀecting system continuity and availability [3].
In GBAS Category I (CAT-I) the responsibility for integrity resides exclusively
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in the GGF. Veriﬁcation and certiﬁcation of GBAS integrity is based on the
analysis of extremely rare events which can lead to large positioning errors. These
events are generally only dealt theoretically or by simulation [4, 5]. The most
important of these rare eﬀects are strong ionospheric gradients, which are not
directly recognized by the GGF by any intended means. Hence the importance
of being able to foresee and mitigate the eﬀects of this anomalies in some way
[6]. Excluding unsafe geometries is one of such ways; ionospheric ﬁeld monitor
is other alternative [7].
2 Protection Levels, Alert Limits and Position Errors
As mentioned, for GBAS CAT-I the GGF is designed to guarantee the integrity
of each broadcasted correction by monitoring, in diverse ways, each related satel-
lite measure to ensure that the correction error is bounded. If that is not the case
the satellite is declared unsafe. The nominal correction error standard deviation
for each satellite σprgnd,i [m] as seen from ground, and the nominal standard de-
viation of the vertical ionospheric gradient σvig [m/m] coming from site studies,
are also broadcasted.
Based on the information received from the GGF and also based in own data,
the aircraft computes horizontal and vertical protection levels (HPL and VPL)
for the measurements for each epoch (every 0.5 second). Particularly VPL are
safe if they are bellow the vertical alert limit (VAL). For GBAS CAT-I precision
approach operations VAL = 10 m at the minimum decision height of 200 ft that
occurs at 6 km from the runway during landing.
If VPL is larger than VAL an integrity alert is generated. VPL is supposed
to exceed the real unknown vertical position error (VPE). If VPE is larger than
VPL but smaller than VAL the information is misleading. If VPE is larger than
VPL and also larger than VAL the information is hazardously misleading.
The aircraft computes VPL as follow (see [8] for details):
VPL = Kﬀmd
√√√√ N∑
i
S2vert,iσ
2
i . (1)
σ2i = σ
2
prgnd,i
+ σ2iono,i + σ
2
air,i + σ
2
tropo,i , (2)
σiono,i = Fiσvig(xaircraft + 2τvaircraft) , (3)
σ2air,i = σ
2
multipath,i + σ
2
noise,i . (4)
Svert,i is the vertical position component of the weighted-least-squares projec-
tions matrix for satellite i (see equation (8)). N is the number of satellite in-view
for the present epoch.
Kﬀmd is the multiplier that determines the required probability of fault-free
missed detection.
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σ2i is the variance of a normal distribution overbounding the range domain error
distribution for satellite i for the fault-free hypothesis H0 (see [9]).
σ2prgnd,i is the fault-free variance of the ground error term associated with the
correction for satellite i.
σiono,i is the ground residual ionospheric uncertainty for satellite i. Fi is the
vertical-to-slam obliquity factor for satellite i. σvig is the standard deviation of
a normal distribution of the residual ionospheric uncertainty due to nominal
spatial decorrelation (a typical value is 4 mm/km). The following factor has
two components, the horizontal distance from GGF to aircraft (xaircraft), and
a synthetic distance produced by a smoothing ﬁlter used to mitigate multipath
and noise with a time constant τ of 100 s. vaircraft is the velocity of the aircraft
in the direction of the airport.
For details on σ2air,i and σ
2
tropo,i see the above last references.
In the above set of equations is not included the vertical protection level under
a single-satellite (satellite i) ephemeris fault, however it is considered in the
computations. Failures of the hypothesis H1 [10] are not relevant to excluding
geometries [11].
3 Ionospheric Threat and Tolerable Error Limit
GPS satellites ﬂy in medium Earth orbits (MEO) at an altitude of approximately
20200 km. The ionosphere is a region of the atmosphere located about 50 –
1000 km above the Earth’s surface. In this region, solar radiation produces free
electrons and ions that cause phase advances and group delays to GPS radio
waves.
Ionospheric fronts (also called ionospheric storms) pose a signiﬁcant threat
to single frequency ground based augmentation systems (GBAS) for airplane
precision approach because they can produce diﬀerential delays between the
aircrafts and the GGF that are not detected in time to generate an integrity
alert [12]. That is, uncorrelated delays could produce misleading and hazardously
misleading situations. Ionospheric fronts are recommended [13] to be modeled by
a moving wedge form with four parameters 1, including the maximum ionospheric
spatial gradient for a particular region [14].
The ﬁrst wedge model has been parameterized for the conterminous U.S.
(CONUS) where ionspheric delay gradients as large as 435 mm/km have been
observed [15]. In the Brazil ionosphere the largest gradient of about 850 mm/km
has been registered [16]. There are not known developments of ionospheric threat
wedge model for Argentina.
The development and utilization of the ionospheric threat model occurs in
two stages [17]. The ﬁrst stage is observation, in which data accumulated over a
lengthy period (usually including the greatest activity of a solar cycle) is collected
to describe and cover the features of ionosphere impact on GBAS [18]. The
1 The four paramenters are: spatial gradient, front moving speed, width and maximum
delay [11].
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results of observation are used to estimate the bounding parameters of the threat
model. The second stage is simulation, in which the completed threat model is
used in a simulation including the GGF and user operation. The simulations
provide estimations of the integrity risk (particularly the hazardously misleading
information (HMI) analyses [19]), the availability, and the impact to the ground
and airborne monitors.
Equation (3) gives the magnitude of ionospheric range error in slant direction
under steady-state conditions. The distance for decision hight (DH) for CAT-
I is 6 km away from the GGF. For a nominal σvig of 4 mm/km the error is
bounded by 0.24 m, in about 99.8 % of the cases. Meanwhile an anomalous large
ionospheric delay gradient of 425 mm/km could produce certainly a range error
as large as 8.5 m.
The maximum vertical position error due to the worst-case user error induced
by an ionosphere anomaly (as estimated by the ground subsystem) need only be
bounded by a tolerable error limit (TEL) that luckily is greater than VAL [11,
15, 20, 21].
Several criteria have been proposed to establish a value for TEL. In [21]
the obstacle clearance surface (OCS) concept is used to assess the safety of a
CAT-I approach if an ionospheric anomaly produces vertical navigation errors.
A maximum vertical error of about 29 m would be allowable at the nominal DH
of 200 ft.
4 Algorithm Description
We followed [11, 15, 22, 23] as references for the algorithm implementation. The
algorithm produces an inﬂation factor that depends of current satellite geometry.
Inﬂation factors larger than 1 are applied to σvig when it nominal value do not
produce a VPL that exceeds VAL when the possible error is not bounded by
TEL. This mechanism excludes unsafe geometries for been considered by the
aircraft.
The algorithm has four principal computational steps: 1. GGF and Subset
Geometries, 2. Ionosphere-Induced Range Error, 3. Ionosphere-Induced Vertical
Error and 4. Parameter Inﬂation.
4.1 GGF and Subset Geometries
Satellites that are visible to the GGF may not be included in the positioning
solution of an approaching airplane. It is assumed that up to two satellites from
the all-in-view satellite at the ground facility are not used by the airborne 2. If
there are N satellites visible to the GBAS ground facility, there are
N∑
k=N−2
(
N
k
)
(5)
2 The minimum number of satellites to be used by the airborne is four.
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subset satellite geometries from the set of N satellites visible to the GGF. Figure
1 shows the evolution fo the number od satellites in view. Figure 2 shows an
example with nine satellites in view at a given epoch, the total number of subset
geometries to consider in this case is,
∑9
k=7
(
9
k
)
= 46 .
Fig. 1. Evolution of the number of visi-
ble satellites above 5◦ during a 24 hours
typical period for a GBAS Ground Facil-
ity as if it was located at La Plata Air-
port (34.9655◦ S, 57.8954◦ W).
Fig. 2. Diagram of satellite positions over
the sky above 5◦ (actually above 30◦ in this
case) from the GBAS Ground Facility point
of view. Nine satellite are in view for the
current epoch.
4.2 Ionosphere-Induced Range Error
The closed-form approximation of the ionosphere-induced diﬀerential range error
is:
ε = g × (xaircraft + 2τvaircraft) . (6)
ε is the ionosphere-induced diﬀerential range error [m].
g is the ionospheric gradient [mm/km].
xaircraft is the separation between the GGF and the approaching airplane [km].
τ is the time constant of the carrier-smoother ﬁlter [s].
vaircraft is the velocity of the approaching airplane [km/s].
Given an airplane at a certain distance and with certain velocity equation
(6) represents the worse case for a given g. In the bibliography (e.g., [24]) consid-
erations are taken about the relative velocity between the ionospheric front and
the particular satellite, and the preventive action of the code-carrier divergence
(CCD) monitor is considered [25]. Neither of those advantages are taken here to
possible reduce the range error ε for every satellite for a particular geometry.
4.3 Ionosphere-Induced Vertical Error
Given airplane and ionosphere front movement geometries, a large ionospheric
gradient may be unobservable to the GGF and meanwhile aﬀecting the airplane
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that is not conveniently prevented of the integrity risk. While an airplane is
approaching a runway, an ionospheric front can impact the SIS of two satellites
(k1 and k2) simultaneously. Hence the worst case ionospheric error in vertical
(IEV) for any pair of satellite of a given geometry for a particular epoch can be
expressed as follows 3,
IEVk1,k2 = |Svert,k1εk1|+ |Svert,k2εk2| . (7)
S = (GTWG)−1GTW . (8)
Gi = [− cos Eli cosAzi − cos Eli sinAzi − sinEli 1] . (9)
W−1 =
⎡
⎢⎢⎢⎣
σ21 0 . . . 0
0 σ22 . . . 0
...
...
. . .
...
0 0 . . . σ2N
⎤
⎥⎥⎥⎦ . (10)
Where Svert,ki is the vertical position component of the weighted-least-squares
projection matrix S for satellite ki (see [8]), this component is dependent of satel-
lite geometry (number of satellite in view and their spatial distribution referred
to the GBAS local ground station) at each epoch; Gi is the row of the observation
matriz G for satellite i; Azi and Eli are the azimuth and elevation of satellite i
(see Figure 2); W−1 is the inverse of the least square weighting matrix; and σi is
the variance of a normal distribution that overbounds the true VPE distribution
for satellite i under the fault-free hypothesis.
The IEV for every pair of each subset geometry considered for the approach-
ing airplane is calculated and compared to obtain the maximum IEV (MIEV)
for each geometry in a particular epoch. The number of pairs to be compared
for each subset geometry with k satellites is(
k
2
)
. (11)
Figure 3 shows and example of MIEVs compared with TEL.
Figure 4 shows the nominal VPLs at the same epoch as Figure 3. The subset
geometries with VPL exceeding VAL are not approved by the airplane and they
can not cause integrity failures even though their MIEVs a greater than TEL.
4.4 Parameter Inﬂation
From Figures 3 and 4 can be observed that some geometries exceeding TEL
does not exceed VAL. In those cases exist potentially hazardous geometries not
excluded by the integrity mechanism supported by the VPL computated with
the nominal σvig broadcasted (see equations (1) and (3)).
3 A less constrained expression for IEV is presented in [22].
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Fig. 3. MIEV for 29 subset geometries
given 7 satellites in view. The 11 sub-
set geometries exceeding TEL are po-
tentially hazardous for this epoch.
Fig. 4. Nominal VPL at the same
epoch as Figure 3. The subset geome-
tries with VPL exceeding VAL can not
cause integrity failures.
If the GGF inﬂates the bradcasted parameters above their nominal values
the airborne VPL increase as well. The most eﬀective parameter to inﬂate is σvig
which increase σ2i .
To obtain the minimum σvig needed for an epoch, VPLs are pre-computed
by the GGF iteratively increasing a inﬂation factor Ivig until all hazardous ge-
ometries are properly removed. Some particular considerations have to be made
to make the computation but exceed the limits of this explanation (see [22, 24]).
The new inﬂated σvig is broadcasted to the airplane. As Figure 5 shows, all
hazardous geometries exceeding TEL are excluded after inﬂation.
5 Algorithm Test
The algorithm implementation was tested for the location coordinates of La
Plata Airport taken samples of recorded ephemeris every minute of a typical
day. The assumed position of the aircraft is the decision point at 200 ft of
elevation. An eﬀective separation of 20 km results from the sum of the actual
distance of 6 km between the reference station and the user, and the 14 km
of synthetic separation generated by the memory of the code-carrier smoothing
ﬁlter used to mitigate multipath error and code noise [8]4. The nominal value
of σvig = 4.0 mm/km. VAL = 10 m for approaching operations. The only
parameter of the threat model to be considered is the maximum ionospheric
gradient g = 400 mm/km.
Figure 6 shows the inﬂation factor Ivig. The inﬂated σvig can not exceed the
maximum allowed broadcast value of 25.5 mm/km [26], meaning that in this
case the maximum permitted value of Ivig = 6.375.
4 A contant velocity of 0.07 km/s is assumed during the approach. The time constant
of the carrier-smothing ﬁlter is τ = 100 s.
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Fig. 5. Satellite geometry exclusion by σvig inﬂation. All hazardous geometries exceed-
ing TEL are excluded after inﬂation.
By applying inﬂation factors to σvig all potentially hazardous geometries
(and many more acceptable geometries) are eliminated from the approved set of
geometries. Hence, system integrity is guaranteed by reducing system availability.
Figure 7 shows the inﬂated VPL for the conditions of the test. The availability
in this case remains 100 %.
6 Conclusions
It is diﬃcult to improve integrity into existing systems while retaining suﬃcient
availability to make the applications viable. As Pullen stated, these challenges
are more than mathematical and require more than simply adding redundancy
to mitigate the eﬀects of individual failures [27].
Most of the anomalies aﬀecting GBAS can be detected by the monitors
founded in the CAT-I ground facility. Even moderate ionospheric anomalies are
detected by the CCD and the clock acceleration monitors [12]. However, the
worst-case ionospheric anomalies require additional mitigation techniques. The
technique used here excludes possible hazardous geometries.
Equations (1) and (7) generate bounds too conservative to represent the
wedge threat model and to accurately model the more realistic geometry and
monitoring conditions found in practice. Nevertheless, the implementation shows
that the availability is optimal for the site of La Plata Airport. This is due to
the well suited geometry conditions, particularly the relatively large number of
satellite always in view above 5◦ in elevation, as is observed in Figure 1.
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Fig. 6. Inﬂation factor Ivig for a 24
hours period. The broadcasted σvig is
the inﬂation factor times the nominal
σvig = 4 mm/km.
Fig. 7. Inﬂated VPL at La Plata airt-
port for a typical day. Availability is
100 % for a DH at 6 km using all the
satellite in view.
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